Civilian Harm Program Quietly Dismantled by the Pentagon, Watchdog Reveals

A civilian harm program that the U.S. military is legally obligated to maintain has been quietly gutted, according to a striking new report from the Pentagon’s own internal watchdog. The findings raise serious questions about accountability, legal compliance, and the human cost of recent U.S. military operations, particularly amid deadly airstrikes in Iran.

A Legally Required Program Left in Ruins

According to the inspector general’s report, the U.S. military no longer possesses the staff, tools, or infrastructure necessary to comply with two federal laws. These statutes require the Department to maintain a functioning civilian casualty policy and to operate a Civilian Protection Center of Excellence, often referred to as the CP CoE.

While the program has not been formally canceled, the report paints a picture of an initiative hollowed out from the inside. Funding for a key data management platform has ended, important committee meetings have stopped, and many dedicated personnel have either been removed or reassigned.

In effect, the program exists on paper but has lost the capacity to do its job.

What the Civilian Harm Program Was Designed to Do

The civilian harm mitigation and response program, known as CHMR, was created to reduce the loss of innocent lives during military operations. It focused on training, procedures, and oversight critical to limiting civilian casualties in active conflict zones.

The program was established in January 2022 by then-Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin under the Biden administration. Its creation followed years of deadly U.S. bombing campaigns across Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

The scale of past civilian harm helps explain why such a program was considered essential. According to Airwars, a civilian harm monitor, U.S. drone and airstrikes killed at least 22,000 civilians, and possibly as many as 48,000, in the two decades following the September 11 attacks in 2001.

A Turning Point in February

The inspector general’s report identifies February as a critical inflection point. During that month, two senior officials, acting Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby and Secretary of the Army Dan Driscoll, separately proposed to Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth that the program be cut back or eliminated entirely.

One proposal reportedly went even further, recommending the complete scrapping of the program’s action plan and the departmental instruction that supported it. Notably, the military began behaving as though these cuts had already been approved, without waiting for an official decision.

Shortly afterward, the United States launched strikes on Iran.

The Human Cost in Iran

The timing of the program’s collapse has drawn intense scrutiny, especially in light of recent events. Pete Hegseth, who oversaw the rebranding of the Department of Defense into the Department of War last September, has faced sharp criticism over deadly attacks in Iran.

One of the most devastating incidents was a U.S. strike in Minab that killed at least 175 people, the majority of them children, at an all-girls school. According to the report, the most deadly U.S. strike on Iran since the war began occurred on February 28 at the Shajareh Tayyebeh Elementary school in Minab, around the same time the watchdog found that CHMR operations had effectively ground to a halt.

When questioned about civilian casualties in Iran, Hegseth has generally redirected blame toward the Iranian regime, accusing it of placing rocket launchers in civilian areas. He has also claimed that no nation in history has taken more precautions than the United States to avoid civilian deaths.

A Different Story From Insiders

The accounts of those familiar with the program tell a starkly different story. Wes J. Bryant, an Air Force combat veteran who served as chief of civilian harm assessments on the CP CoE program, offered a blunt assessment.

Bryant suggested that only a thin shell of the department remains, arguing that the cuts were tied to political pressure surrounding controversial operations. According to him, just seven people are left reporting to the program, and they have been effectively shut out of operations and relegated to what he described as a small “closet office” in Virginia.

Bryant himself was forced out of his role last spring, around the same time the administration reportedly removed safeguards that had previously restrained the authorization of lethal force.

Confusion, Halted Oversight, and Incomplete Data

The report reveals a program plagued by disorganization and neglect. Key findings include:

• The CHMR steering committee, responsible for overseeing the entire program, held its final meeting in December
• One combatant command reported it had largely divested its CHMR personnel and responsibilities as early as March 2025
• Officials expressed reluctance to commit resources to a program they believed might soon be eliminated
• Clear offices of primary responsibility for the program’s 133 action items were not assigned until December, the final year of a four-year plan
• The program’s implementation tracking tool reportedly contained data that a senior official admitted was incomplete and inaccurate

Together, these details suggest a program that was allowed to deteriorate well before any formal decision was made about its future.

Conflicting Official Statements

In response to a draft version of the report in December, Elbridge Colby defended the Pentagon’s position. He argued that the department remained in compliance with federal law, claiming that leadership continued to collaborate with the CP CoE and shared materials on lessons learned from past civilian casualty events.

Colby stated that the department would meet its training goals by the end of the following year and described a review of the CP CoE as being underway. He also asserted that the unit continued to operate with dedicated full-time staff.

However, the inspector general’s findings, along with accounts from insiders, cast significant doubt on these reassurances.

Growing Concern Among Experts

Civilian protection advocates have expressed alarm at the program’s apparent collapse. Madison Hunke, U.S. program manager at the Center for Civilians in Conflict, warned that the situation in Iran reflects a troubling shift in the Department’s approach.

She noted that devastating levels of civilian harm have been observed in Iran since February, and questioned what future U.S. operations might look like if civilian protection programs continue to be weakened or dismantled.

What Happens Next

The inspector general has given the Pentagon until June 12 to submit a plan addressing the failures identified in the report. The Pentagon did not respond to a request for comment on the findings.

The coming weeks will be critical in determining whether the Department restores the program to legal compliance or allows it to fade further into irrelevance.

Why This Matters

At its core, this story is about more than bureaucracy or internal restructuring. The civilian harm program represents a legal and moral commitment to reducing the deaths of innocent people during war.

When such a program is quietly dismantled, especially during a period of active military strikes, the consequences can be measured in human lives. Critics argue that the timing, the lack of transparency, and the mounting civilian death toll in Iran point to a deliberate weakening of essential safeguards.

Final Thoughts

The quiet dismantling of the Pentagon’s civilian harm program marks a serious and troubling development. With federal law requiring its operation and a watchdog now sounding the alarm, the pressure is on the Department to explain its actions and chart a path forward.

As the June deadline approaches, the broader question remains unanswered: will the United States recommit to protecting civilians in conflict, or will these critical safeguards continue to erode in the shadows of war?