Iran Rebuffs US Overture While Chemical Weapons Claims Surface in Yemen and Iraq’s PM Walks a Tightrope

Iran negotiations appear no closer to resuming despite a direct letter from the US Vice President, as Tehran continues to insist that Washington must satisfy a list of preconditions before any talks begin. That stalemate forms the backdrop to two other developments across the region: unverified accusations that the Houthis used toxic chemicals in Yemen, and a delicate balancing act by Iraq’s prime minister between American demands and Iranian-backed militias.

Here is what the latest picture looks like.

A Letter Unlikely to Change Minds

According to a senior US official and an Iranian counterpart who spoke to the New York Times on October 28, Vice President JD Vance sent a message through Qatari intermediaries to Major General Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The letter proposed broad, face-to-face negotiations covering the full range of issues between the two countries.

The choice of recipient was deliberate. US officials reportedly believed Rezaei could sway hardliners inside the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who oppose any deal with Washington. How that assessment was reached is unclear, and the evidence suggests it may be misplaced.

Rezaei has recently restated an uncompromising position. His conditions for talks include:

A US halt to military operations on every front.

The release of frozen Iranian assets.

An end to the American naval blockade.

Only after those steps, in his framing, could anything else be discussed. This stance mirrors the official Iranian government line, which also demands recognition of Tehran’s claimed authority over the Strait of Hormuz.

The letter itself may have widened the gap rather than narrowed it. The officials said Vance insisted that Iran’s nuclear programme must be on the table from the very beginning, a demand that directly contradicts Rezaei’s sequencing.

Why Rezaei Matters

The Supreme National Security Council is Iran’s top body for defence and foreign policy decisions. Rezaei, a former IRGC commander and one-time senior military adviser, was installed as its secretary on August 9 by Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. That appointment is widely read as tightening the supreme leader’s grip on the council and locking in a hardline outlook.

On October 29, the IRGC-linked Tasnim News Agency reported that Tehran had not yet replied to the letter and reiterated that any deviation from its seven stated conditions would be rejected. Taken together, the signals point toward a negative or non-committal response rather than a breakthrough.

Yemen: Serious Allegations, No Evidence Yet

In a separate development, Yemen’s internationally recognised government accused the Houthi movement on October 28 of deploying chemical weapons against its forces in central Taiz Governorate.

The government’s media office in Taiz cited battlefield reports that Houthi artillery rounds may have contained internationally prohibited toxic agents during fighting near Kahlan in Sabr al Mawadim District and al Aqroud in al Misrakh District. The office also claimed that civilians and allied local fighters had suffered breathing difficulties and lost consciousness in earlier, unspecified incidents.

Several caveats are essential:

The Yemeni government offered no physical or documentary proof.

No independent local sources have corroborated the claims.

No similar reports have emerged from other active fronts such as Taiz City or the Red Sea coast.

If the described symptoms are accurate, they would be consistent with irritant agents like tear gas or chlorine delivered in heavy concentrations, rather than nerve agents. Yemeni officials, including Information Minister Muammar Eryani, have previously alleged that the Houthis are sourcing materials for a chemical programme, but those claims have never been independently confirmed.

The accusations come as Houthi forces have struggled to hold ground in these districts while government-aligned units push to break the encirclement of central Taiz. The gravity of a chemical weapons claim means it cannot be dismissed, but it also cannot yet be treated as established fact.

Iraq: Zaydi Balances Washington and the Militias

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaydi is attempting something many of his predecessors found impossible: satisfying the United States while managing Iranian-aligned armed groups at home. Reports from October 29 suggest he has reached an understanding with certain militias under which they would give up their weapons in return for influential government posts.

One expected appointment would hand a militia-linked individual the role of secretary-general of the Council of Ministers, a position long occupied by someone close to the cleric Muqtada al Sadr. This follows an earlier arrangement, assessed around October 15, in which three militias were reportedly granted control over selected ministries.

The strategy has a clear logic. Rewarding groups that agree to disarm is meant to encourage full compliance and pressure holdouts to join a disarmament plan that targets completion by June 2027. The Shia Coordination Framework endorsed parts of that plan in late September.

The risks are equally clear:

The publicly known details leave considerable room for militias to evade real disarmament.

Washington has consistently objected to militia-affiliated figures holding senior federal positions.

Framework leaders complain that Zaydi’s independent talks undercut their own negotiating channel.

Consolidating Personal Power

Zaydi’s manoeuvring also serves his own political ambitions. A Framework official told Iraqi media on October 28 that the prime minister is reshaping his administration without consulting the bloc. He has replaced the head of his office, previously a member of former Prime Minister Sudani’s party, with a technocrat who sat on a 2025 committee that designated the Houthis and Hezbollah as terrorist groups and froze their assets. That designation was quickly reversed under pressure from Iranian-backed actors.

Installing someone associated with a decision favourable to US counter-Iran efforts may be Zaydi’s way of offsetting the militia appointments. He is also reportedly preparing to dismiss 69 advisers tied to his predecessor.

Zaydi has characterised the Framework’s own negotiations with armed groups as inherently biased, since the bloc includes militia members. His insistence on dealing with them directly reflects a push for autonomy that could, in principle, align with American hopes for a more sovereign Iraqi government, even as the concessions he offers trouble Washington.

Iran’s Broader War Aims

Analysts assess that Tehran’s overall objectives in the current conflict include:

Winning international acceptance of Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz.

Wearing down America’s capacity and appetite for continued fighting.

Re-establishing deterrence against the United States and its regional allies.

Driving a wedge between Washington, Israel, and the Arab states.

No significant new US or partner military operations were reported on October 29. With diplomacy stalled, Yemen’s accusations unverified, and Iraq’s politics in flux, the region remains in a holding pattern that could break in any direction.